Police Governance

Policing Priorities: Essex Law School academic submits evidence to the Home Affairs Committee

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Photo by Maggie Yap on Unsplash

Policing in England and Wales is under more scrutiny than ever, following high-profile criminal and disciplinary cases involving police officers, low charging and detection rates (not least for rape and sexual offences cases), and lingering concerns about how forces deal with women and people from minority communities.

On 21 July 2022, the Home Affairs Committee launched an inquiry into the priorities of policing at a time when public confidence in the police is low and six of the nation’s forces have been hit with special measures. The Committee will publish its final report in early 2023. Dr. Simon Cooper responded to the Committee’s call for evidence.

Dr Cooper’s research, previously reported exclusively in The Times and published in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, found that Police and Crime Panels (PCPs), introduced as part of flagship Conservative reforms in 2011 are ‘toothless’, leaving police accountability, for the first time in history, largely dependent on the one-to-one relationships between Chief Constables and elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs).  

His submission to the Home Affairs Committee argues that the relational accountabilities of Chief Constables, PCCs and PCPs are unbalanced, untested, and risky. 

In addition to recommending that the role and powers of PCPs be strengthened, a key conclusion of his submission is that the Home Secretary must exercise their statutory power and consult with the parties bound by the Policing Protocol to examine if the Policing Protocol should be varied or possibly replaced.

Notably, Dr. Cooper’s submission also calls on the Home Secretary to introduce a Memorandum of Understanding to bind PCCs and Chief Constables to ensure ‘effective, constructive working relationships’ are not just a quixotic pursuit but a practical reality that helps safeguard the accountability and governance of policing.

Dr. Cooper’s previous work was cited by the House of Commons in its 2021 report on Police and Crime Commissioners and the House of Lords in its 2022 report on Police and Crime Commissioners: Powers and Functions. Previous recommendations made by him were also adopted by the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales in 2022. 

Report urges Home Secretary to Reform Police Accountability

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Police accountability is paralysed by “ineffective and impotent” Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) that are powerless to hold Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to account, new research reveals.

The findings, reported exclusively in The Times, come as six of the nation’s forces have been hit with special measures by regulators, the Met has been rocked by a series of controversies, and when the Home Office conducts Part 2 of the Police and Crime Commissioner Review.

Dr Simon Cooper of Essex Law School, has found that PCPs, introduced as part of flagship Conservative reforms in 2011 are “toothless”, leaving police accountability, for the first time in history, largely dependent on the one-to-one relationships between Chief Constables and elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs).

As part of the study, Dr Cooper gained unprecedented access to senior policing figures including someone directly involved in introducing the current accountability model.

In his report, which will be published in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Dr Cooper urges Home Secretary Suella Braverman to launch an urgent review to “safeguard the accountability and governance of policing.”

He also recommends the introduction of binding contracts between PCCs and Chief Constables after finding the current structure is “unbalanced, untested and risky.”

‘Police Relational Accountabilities: The Paralysis of Police Accountability?’ is the result of a qualitative study based on 17 interviews with Chief Constables, PCCs and Chairs of PCPs across five police force areas as well as one person directly involved in introducing the current system and one of the most senior figures in policing at a national level.

Anonymous 90-minute interviews reveal an overwhelming view that PCPs, which are meant to support, scrutinise and maintain a regular ‘check and balance’ on PCCs, are “entirely impotent and ineffective” according to the report.

One PCC stated that “PCCs aren’t concerned or fearful of their PCP” with another saying “my mandate is from the people who elected me so sod the PCP.” Even PCP Chairs, whose only sanctioning power is to publicly shame a PCC, said “we are toothless” and “PCPs can’t do anything, there are no checks and balances at all.”

“The result is that for the first time in the history of modern policing, the accountability and governance of policing is rendered subject to the one-to-one relationship between a PCC and their Chief Constable. A relationship that could be fractious, dysfunctional, volatile or overly cosy,” explained Dr Cooper.

That risk is backed up by the interviews with one Chief Constable saying “I know some of my colleagues have awful relationships with their PCCs”. One of the most senior people in policing at a national level said that accountability rests “not just on the relationship but also on the calibre, experience and wisdom of the person elected as PCC and believe you me that varies enormously.”

Dr Cooper said: “The case of Cressida Dick, who one report has found was ‘constructively dismissed’ by her PCC, London Mayor Sadiq Khan, demonstrates what can happen when the relationship between a Chief Constable and their PCC breaks down, and reported wider problems in The Met Police show why an effective structure of police accountability is so vital.

“As laid out by one of the Chief Constables I interviewed, the current model for police accountability rests too heavily on a series of ‘ifs’: if the PCP is effective, if the PCC has principles and experience, if the Chief Constable is of the right character then it can be effective but this is not an effective or sustainable model for holding a modern police force to account.”

Dr Cooper’s previous work was cited by the House of Commons in its 2021 report on Police and Crime Commissioners and previous recommendations made by him were adopted by the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales in 2022.

This story was first published on the University of Essex’s news webpages and is reproduced on the ELR Blog with permission and thanks.

Police relational accountabilities: The paralysis of police accountability?

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Image by James Eades

In his new article published in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Dr Simon Cooper of Essex Law School examines the new relational accountabilities of Chief Constables, Police, and Crime Commissioners [PCCs] and Crime Panels [PCPs] in England and Wales. 

Referring to a number of recent reports and reviews, the discussion initially focuses on the effectiveness of these relationships and, in particular, the inefficiency of PCPs. 

Dr Cooper’s article develops current understanding, showing that PCPs may cause a new unforeseen consequence. Namely, the exercise of accountability and the governance of policing may be unusually reactive to the ‘one-to-one’ accountability relationship between PCCs and Chief Constables.

Such recommendations are made to strengthen the exercise of accountability and the governance of policing. Specifically, the Home Secretary is encouraged to review the Policing Protocol Order (2011) and issue a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure ‘effective, constructive working relationships’ are not just a quixotic pursuit but a practical reality that safeguards the governance of policing.

Dr Cooper’s research is all the more important in light of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services finding in 2022 that there is an ‘atmosphere of mistrust and fear’ between PCCs and Chief Constables and The Police Foundation reporting ‘a crisis of confidence’, recommending ‘root and branch reform.’

The article can be accessed in full here.

Essex Research Informs Police Review

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Photo by Bruno Martins 

Research by Dr. Simon Cooper on police accountability and the role of Police and Crime Commissioners has been cited in a major nationwide review of policing.

The Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, which was conducted by the Police Foundation and chaired by Sir Michael Barber, has called for a radical shake-up of the way forces are run.

It cites research by Dr. Cooper, from the School of Law, which showed that the power of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to remove Chief Constables from office is having a “corrosive” effect on policing and police accountability.

Drawing on Dr. Cooper’s research, which was published in The Criminal Law Review (Issue 4, 2020), the Strategic Review specifically highlights his finding that a vital independent review process, meant to safeguard against a compromised PCC wrongly removing a Chief Constable from office, has only been used once since 2012 and didn’t impact the decision.

The authors of the report note that “such untrammelled power in the hands of one person has created job insecurity throughout the Chief Constable rank and this in turn has led to increased churn and reduced tenure.”

Dr. Cooper said: “Policing is at an inflection point. The Strategic Review comes at a time when public confidence is low and policing is under pressure. The Strategic Review will help shape the future of policing.

“The interviews I conducted find the PCC’s power to remove Chief Constables has already compromised the independence of senior officers. As currently formulated, the PCC’s s. 38 power creates an environment in which it would be possible for a PCC – effectively a layperson – to command, overrule and potentially even control a Chief Constable. We urgently require a Select Committee inquiry to re-examine the PCC’s power to remove their Chief Constable.”

Dr. Cooper’s research was based on a series of interviews with PCCs, Chief Constables, and members of Police and Crime Panels (PCPs), as well as the person responsible for introducing the current system and one of the most senior figures in policing at a national level.

This post first appeared on the University of Essex’s news webpage and is reproduced on the ELR Blog with permission and thanks.

Police and Crime Commissioners: A Dislocated Expectation?

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Image by James Eades

New research, based on exclusive interviews with high-ranking figures from across UK policing – including Chief Constables, PCCs, one of the most senior persons in policing and one of the persons involved with introducing PCCs – suggests a postcode lottery in police accountability. The calibre of individual PCCs is seen as the key factor in ensuring adequate oversight, with stark differences exposed between forces.

Dr. Simon Cooper, from the Essex Law School, gained unprecedented access to key figures from all sides, on the condition of their anonymity.

Dr. Cooper’s findings, which were published in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice and subsequently cited in the House of Commons Police and Crime Commissioners 2021 Report as well as House of Lords 2022 Report Police and Crime Commissioners: Powers and Functions, support the argument that the current system can work.

However, Dr. Cooper identifies a “significant anomaly”, with accountability dependent on the relative strengths of PCCs and Chief Constables and the relationship between the two. Success, in this respect, can be seen to “hinge on luck”.

Dr. Cooper said:

“These findings suggest a significant variation in how police accountability is administered around the country. While one Chief Constable described being regularly ‘grilled’ by their PCC, some Commissioners are seen as ill-equipped, ill-prepared and potentially ego-driven. The importance placed by the system on these single individuals suggests there is a real possibility that some Chief Constables are being held to account more effectively than others.”

One Chief Constable, identified as Chief Constable D, outlined the issues that exist when dealing with their elected PCC, contrasting it with the previous ‘tripartite’ structure, where Chief Constables would report to the Home Secretary and their local Police Authority:

“…there is a significant risk that the relationship (between PCC and CC) either becomes excessively hostile, excessively friendly or… there isn’t the balance, additional questioning or informing of the debate that a wider group would give. (…) Because of poor safeguards and governance arrangements it too quickly descends into personalities and subjectivity in which accountability becomes likeability, becomes re-electability. Accountability becomes all of those things it shouldn’t.”

Another Chief Constable, Chief Constable C, underlined the importance of the PCC-Chief Constable relationship, noting the impact of individual experience and characters:

“I have seen evidence of PCCs who are ill-equipped and ill-prepared and actually don’t have the skills to understand big organisations making sweeping statements and making assumptions about individuals without any basis whatsoever. I have also seen Chief Constables that do not want to adapt to a new way of working and will be very obstructive towards PCCs.”

Summarising the impact on oversight, Police and Crime Commissioner D asked:

“The question is can a PCC be played by a Chief Constable? They clearly could be and some I suspect are. I am quite sure that there are some Chief Constables who just pay lip service to their PCC.”

The current system was seen by some as placing an impractical burden on one individual. The lack of a ‘pool of different views’ limits opportunities for the PCC to moderate their thoughts and has the potential to leave the PCC either exposed or guided by advice from others, with no formal oversight role. PCC A commented:

“Presumably if it’s something they (the PCC) didn’t know a lot about they talk to a lot of people about it but you don’t see any of those conversations played out.”

In reality, one senior figure, Person Z, was left questioning the original design of the PCC system:

“For one person, even though they are elected, to replace the wisdom and contribution of 19 [Police Authority members] is a tall ask. There’s only one person [the PCC] providing scrutiny [of Chief Constables] and that’s a heavy responsibility, so in terms of scrutiny of course it’s a lot less. Palpably has it worked? No… I suspect PCCs might, in hindsight, be regarded as a blunder.”

Dr. Cooper’s findings suggest a need for the Home Secretary to review the Policing Protocol and for an Accountability Code of Practice to be issued. He said:

“This research encourages the Home Secretary to exercise their power and urgently review The Policing Protocol Order. In its current form, the PPO is overly broad, presumption-based, loosely-worded and generic, with a resulting impact on accountability.”

Dr. Cooper’s research is published at a time of a continuing debate on police accountability. The Police Foundation found a “crisis of confidence”, recommending “root and branch reform”, and Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services recommended a “profound and far-reaching police reform” and there have been calls for a Royal Commission.

Dr. Cooper’s research also found that in some instances the PCC model is viewed favourably when contrasted with its forerunner, with the previous bureaucracy and resulting backlog replaced by a “single point of decision-making” and a greater “visibility” of the decision-making process at a local level.

Other interviewees, however, suggested such appearances could be deceptive. PCC E commented:

“We have gained in terms of visibility but lost in terms of detailed scrutiny that the Police Authority was capable of.”

Dr. Simon Cooper’s article titled ‘Police and Crime Commissioners: A Dislocated Expectation?’ was published in Vol. 15, Issue 3 of Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice and can be accessed via the publisher’s website here. The House of Commons report on PCCs, citing Dr. Cooper’s research (pp. 10-11), can be read here. The House of Lords report also citing his research (para. 1.3) can be read here.

This ELR post was updated on 10 November 2022 to reflect recent developments in the impact of Dr. Cooper’s research.

Police and Crime Commissioners: A Dislocated Expectation

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Image courtesy: Postdlf

In the run-up to May’s elections, new research has found stark differences in the calibre of Police and Crime Commissioners, with some “ill equipped”, leaving police accountability “hinging on luck”.

New research, based on exclusive interviews with high-ranking figures from across UK policing, suggests a postcode lottery in police accountability. The calibre of individual Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) is seen as the key factor in ensuring adequate oversight, with stark differences exposed between forces.

Dr Simon Cooper, from our School of Law, gained unprecedented access to key figures from all sides, on condition of their anonymity. He interviewed PCCs, Chief Constables and members of Police and Crime Panels [PCPs] in five police forces, as well as one of the persons directly involved with introducing the current system and one of the most senior figures in policing at a national level.

While Dr Cooper’s findings, published in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, support the argument that the current system can work, he identifies a “significant anomaly”, with accountability dependent on the relative strengths of PCCs and Chief Constables and the relationship between the two. Success, in this respect, can be seen to “hinge on luck”.

Dr Cooper said: “These findings suggest a significant variation in how police accountability is administered around the country. While one Chief Constable described being regularly ‘grilled’ by their PCC, some Commissioners are seen as ill-equipped, ill-prepared and potentially ego-driven. The importance placed by the system on these single individuals suggests there is a real possibility that some Chief Constables are being held to account more effectively than others.”

One Chief Constable, identified as Chief Constable D, outlined the issues that exist when dealing with their elected PCC, contrasting it with the previous ‘tripartite’ structure, where Chief Constables would report to the Home Secretary and their local Police Authority: “…there is a significant risk that the relationship (between PCC and CC) either becomes excessively hostile, excessively friendly or… there isn’t the balance, additional questioning or informing of the debate that a wider group would give. (…) Because of poor safeguards and governance arrangements it too quickly descends into personalities and subjectivity in which accountability becomes likeability, becomes re-electability. Accountability becomes all of those things it shouldn’t.”

Another Chief Constable, Chief Constable C, underlined the importance of the PCC-CC relationship, noting the impact of individual experience and characters: “I have seen evidence of PCCs who are ill equipped and ill prepared and actually don’t have the skills to understand big organisations making sweeping statements and making assumptions about individuals without any basis what so ever. I have also seen Chief Constables that do not want to adapt to a new way of working and will be very obstructive towards PCCs.”

Summarising the impact on oversight, Police and Crime Commissioner D asked: “The question is can a PCC be played by a Chief Constable? They clearly could be and some I suspect are. I am quite sure that there are some Chief Constables who just play lip service to their PCC.”

The current system was seen by some as placing an impractical burden on one individual. The lack of a ‘pool of different views’ limits opportunities for the PCC to moderate their thoughts and has the potential to leave the PCC either exposed or guided by advice from others, with no formal oversight role. PCC A commented: “Presumably if it’s something they (the PCC) didn’t know a lot about they talk to a lot of people about it but you don’t see any of those conversations played out.”

In reality, one senior figure, Person Z, was left questioning the original design of the PCC system: “For one person, even though they are elected, to replace the wisdom and contribution of 19 [Police Authority members] is a tall ask. There’s only one person [the PCC] providing scrutiny [of Chief Constables] and that’s a heavy responsibility, so in terms of scrutiny of course it’s a lot less. Palpably has it worked? No… I suspect PCCs might, in hindsight, be regarded as a blunder.”

Dr Cooper says his findings suggest a need for the Home Secretary to review the Policing Protocol and for an Accountability Code of Practice to be issued.

Dr Cooper said: “This research encourages the Home Secretary to exercise their power and urgently review The Policing Protocol Order. In its current form, the PPO is overly broad, presumption-based, loosely-worded and generic, with a resulting impact on accountability.”

Dr Cooper’s research is published at a time of continuing debate on police accountability. The Police Foundation recently launched a Strategic Review, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services recommended “profound and far reaching police reform” and there have been calls for a Royal Commission.

Dr Cooper’s research also found that in some instances the PCC model is viewed favourably when contrasted with its forerunner, with the previous bureaucracy and resulting backlog replaced by a “single point of decision-making” and a greater “visibility” of the decision-making process at a local level.

Other interviewees, however, suggested such appearances could be deceptive. PCC E commented: “We have gained in terms of visibility but lost in terms of detailed scrutiny that the Police Authority was capable of.”

The full text of the article is published is available in open access here.

This piece was originally uploaded as part of a University of Essex news story here.

Police and Crime Commissioners’ power “corrosive,” research finds

/ Alexandros Antoniou / 1 Comment
Image by Fungai Tichawangana

The power of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to remove Chief Constables from office is having a “corrosive” effect on policing and police accountability, research undertaken at the University of Essex indicates.

The research, by Dr Simon Cooper of our School of Law, identifies two new and significant concerns regarding PCCs’ powers. He is calling for a select committee inquiry to re-examine the system for holding Chief Constables to account.

Dr Cooper gained unprecedented access to key figures from all sides, interviewing PCCs, Chief Constables and members of Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) in five police forces, as well as the person responsible for introducing the current system and one of the most senior figures in policing at a national level.

Dr Cooper said:

The interviews conducted for this research find the PCC’s power to remove their Chief Constable has already compromised the independence of these senior officers. As currently formulated, the PCC’s s. 38 power creates an environment in which it would be possible for a PCC – effectively a lay person – to command, overrule and potentially even control a Chief Constable. We urgently require a select committee inquiry to re-examine a PCC’s power to remove their Chief Constable.

The introduction, in 2012, of elected PCCs was a key element of Prime Minister David Cameron’s Big Society, billed as the replacement of an outdated bureaucracy with devolved, democratically-accountable oversight.

The PCC’s s. 38 power, which gives a PCC the exclusive power to remove their Chief Constable from power, and to exercise a broad discretion in reaching this decision, was seen as vital to delivering accountability.

Dr Cooper’s research, which was published in this year’s Volume 4 of the Criminal Law Review (pp. 291-305) and attracted the attention of The Times (£), identifies two new areas of concern. First, a PCC’s ability to remove their Chief Constable could cause an instability in police leadership and a potential culture of compliance, as Chief Constables – many close to retirement – avoid conflict with their PCC. The ease with which a PCC could remove a Chief Constable – contrasted with the complex process for removing a PCC – is seen as having resulted in a concentration of power at odds with the principles of good governance. Second, Chief Constables could be developing a practice of abstention and risk, becoming indebted to their PCC.

Senior figures interviewed by Dr Cooper also noted a ripple effect at the rank of Chief Constable, as progression to the most senior rank is no longer seen as attractive.

Interviewed by Dr Cooper, one PCC noted:

There has been a power shift, it’s a significant change and it’s no surprise that about half of the Chief Constables have gone.

Dr Cooper’s call is for a select committee inquiry to re-examine the s. 38 power, with the suggestion that the currently-limited powers of PCPs could be increased, a Code of Practice introduced and the Policing Protocol amended to encourage PCPs to proactively seek the professional advice of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Service when a PCC decides to remove a Chief Constable.

The s. 38 power has proven highly controversial. In May 2013, The House of Commons Home Office Committee argued it was “operationally disruptive, and costly, and damaging to the police and individuals concerned.” In the same year, the Stevens Review suggested that this power risked “exerting a damaging chilling effect over the leadership of the police service.”

This post originally appeared on the website of the University of Essex and is reproduced here with permission and thanks.